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Abstract. In the days immediately following the contested June 2009
Presidential election, Iranians attempting to reach news content and so-
cial media platforms were subject to unprecedented levels of the degra-
dation, blocking and jamming of communications channels. Rather than
shut down networks, which would draw attention and controversy, the
government was rumored to have slowed connection speeds to rates that
would render the Internet nearly unusable, especially for the consump-
tion and distribution of multimedia content. Since, political upheavals
elsewhere have been associated with headlines such as “High usage slows
down Internet in Bahrain” and “Syrian Internet slows during Friday
protests once again,” with further rumors linking poor connectivity with
political instability in Myanmar and Tibet. For governments threatened
by public expression, the throttling of Internet connectivity appears to be
an increasingly preferred and less detectable method of stifling the free
flow of information. In order to assess this perceived trend and begin
to create systems of accountability and transparency on such practices,
we attempt to outline an initial strategy for utilizing a ubiquitious set of
network measurements as a monitoring service, then apply such method-
ology to shed light on the recent history of censorship in Iran.
Keywords: censorship, national Internet, Iran, throttling, M-Lab
1 Introduction
”Prison is like, there’s no bandwidth.” - Eric Schmidt1
The primary purpose of this paper is to assess the validity of claims that the
international connectivity of information networks used by the Iranian public
has been subject to substantial throttling based on a historical and correlated
set of open measurements of network performance. We attempt to determine
whether this pattern is the result of administrative policy, as opposed to the
service variations that naturally occur on a network, particularly one subject to
the deleterious effects of trade restrictions, economic instability, sabotage and
? This project received grant funding from the Center for Global Communication
Studies at the University of Pennsylvania’s Annenberg School for Communcation
and Google Research.
1 Remarks before Mobile World Congress. February 28, 2012
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2 Collin Anderson
other outcomes of international politics. Overall, we outline our initial findings
in order to provoke broader discussion on what we perceive to be the growing
trend of network performance degradation as a means of stifling the free flow of
information, and solicit feedback on our claims in order to create universally ap-
plicable structures of accountability. Furthermore, to the fullest extent possible,
we focus our assessment on that which is quantitatively measurable, and limit
attempts to augur the political or social aspects of the matters at hand. As in
any other closed decision-making system, a wealth of rumors dominate the cur-
rent perception of the actions taken by the government and telecommunications
companies. Where these rumors are mentioned, they are discussed in order to
test validity, and not cited as evidence.
This paper is not intended to be comprehensive, and we err on the side of
brevity where possible. Toward these ends, our contributions are threefold:
1. outline a methodology for the detection of the disruption of network
performance and infer purposeful intent based on indicators, differen-
tiated from normal network failures;
2. begin to identify potential periods of throttling, based on available
historical data;
3. attempt to enumerate those institutions that are not subject to inter-
ference.
The experiments described herein are motivated toward collecting initial,
open-ended data on an opaque phenomenon; where possible our results and
code are publicly available for outside investigation at:
http://github.com/collina/Throttling
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the following sec-
tion, we identify the infrastructural properties of networks relevant to our line
of inquiry that enable states and intermediaries to control access to content
and service performance. We describe the dataset core to our investigation in
Section 3 and Section 4 describes a mixed methods approach used to interpret
measurements and extract broader information on the nature of the network.
Finally, these techniques are applied in Section 5 toward identifing periods of
significant interest in the connectivity of Iran-originating users. We conclude by
enumerating the outstanding questions and future research directions.
2 Domestic Network Structure Considerations
After the declaration that the incumbent president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,
had won a majority in the first round of voting, supporters of reformist candi-
dates rallied against what was perceived to be election fixing in order to pre-
serve the status quo of the power structure of the state. Already well-acquainted
with bypassing Internet filtering using circumvention and privacy tools, such as
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VPNs and Tor, government blocks on YouTube and Facebook were minor imped-
iments for activists to share videos and news in support of their cause. Unused to
large-scale challenges against the legitimacy and integrity of the system, the gov-
ernment appears to have responded by ordering the shutdown of mobile phone
services, increased filtering of social media sites and the disruption of Internet
access [9].
Iran’s telecommunications infrastructure and service market differs substan-
tially from the regulatory environment of broadcast television, wherein the state
maintains an absolute monopoly on authorized transmissions [27]. The current on
network ownership was initially shaped by the Supreme Council of the Cultural
Revolution in 2001 under the directives “Overall Policies on Computer-based
Information-providing Networks” and “Regulations and Conditions Related to
Computerized Information Networks” [15,16]. Internet Service Providers (ISPs),
which offer last-mile network connectivity, are privatized, but subject to strict
licensing requirements and communications laws that hold companies liable for
the activities of their customers.2 In addition to administrative requirements for
filtering according to a nebulous and growing definition of subjects deemed ‘crim-
inal,’ ISPs are forced to purchase their upstream connectivity from government-
controlled international gateways, such as the state-owned telecommunications
monopoly, the Telecommunication Company of Iran (TCI), which appear to im-
plement an auxiliary, and often more sophisticated, censorship regime on traffic
in transit across its network. Even amongst privately-owned networks, perspec-
tive entrepreneurs appear to be encouraged or coerced into ownership consor-
tiums with the ever present set of Bonyads, charitable trusts often connected
with the Iranian ideological establishment [3]. While a substantial amount has
been written on controls imposed on content, the salient principles to our domain
of research are the obligations of independent providers to the state’s adminis-
trative orders and the infrastructural centrality of two entities in Iran’s network,
the TCI’s subsidiary, the Information Technology Company (ITC, AS12880),
and the Research Center of Theoretical Physics & Mathematics (IPM, AS6736).
As a result, all traffic to foreign-based hosts, and likely a majority of connections
internally, route through entities with either direct or informal relationships to
the government, as demonstrated in Figure 1.
The centralization of international communications gateways and domes-
tic peering (the linkages between networks) enables anticompetitive and po-
tentially undemocratic practices that would be more administratively difficult
and economically expensive in an open and multi-stakeholder telecommunica-
tions market. This design is not specific to Iran alone nor is it an indicator
2 While ISPs are the public face of Internet access to the Iranian public, these compa-
nies are only one component of a broader domestic telecommunications infrastructure
responsible for delivering domestic and international traffic. ISPs interconnect with
each other, known as peering, to provide accessibility to hosts within their network
and share routes for traffic between others. Not all ISPs are consumer-facing, with
some infrastructure companies acting as dedicated Internet exchange points (IXPs)
between networks.
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Fig. 1: International Pathways to Iranian Hosts (Traceroute)
of a government’s desire to control citizen access. Centralization often resem-
bles a commonplace model of public-sector infrastructure development or state
revenue generation from telecommunications surcharges [29]. With the intro-
duction of the Internet, regulators reflexively extended their mandate to include
online communications, as the most common forms of physical connectivity of-
ten utilize telephony networks, as well as bringing competitive services such as
voice-over-IP. When the network monitoring company Renesys addressed this
topic in response to the Internet shutdowns of Egypt and Syria, they framed the
dangers and fragility of the centralization of gateways as “the number of phone
calls (or legal writs, or infrastructure attacks) that would have to be performed
in order to decouple the domestic Internet from the global Internet,” naming 61
countries at ‘severe risk’ for disconnection [17].
Although disconnection, failure and filtering are more perceivable forms of
disruption, the same principles of risk and exposure apply to the degradation
of connections. Throttling is not on its own a form of censorship or intent to
stifle expression. In the context of Iran, a scarcity of available bandwidth and
inadequate infrastructure has created a demonstrable need for limiting resource-
intensive services and prioritizing real-time communications traffic, especially in
rural markets [24]. In other cases, often under the terms “quality of service” or
“traffic shaping,” throttling is a means of providing higher performance to less
bandwidth-intensive applications, through initially provisioning of faster speeds
to a connection that is then slowed after a threshold is reached. These prac-
tices have spurred heated debate between civil society and telecommunications
providers in the United States and Europe within the framework of “network
neutrality,” pitting the core principle that communications on the Internet be
treated equally against claims by companies that the bandwidth demands of on-
line services exceeds current availability. However, the allegations of throttling
we attempt to address differ substantially from these debates in scope and ex-
ecution, and fit into a history of interference with the free flow of information,
offline and online, and recurrent security intrusions on the end-to-end privacy of
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the communication of users, often originating from government-affiliated actors
[23].
3 Setup
Degradations in network performance and content accessibility can be the prod-
uct of a number of phenomenon and externalities, localized to one point or
commonly experienced across a wider range of Internet users. In order to accu-
rately and definitively measure broadly-targeted degradation, such as throttling,
it is necessary to obtain data from a diversity of hosts, in terms of connection
type, physical location, time of usage and nature of usage.
A number of tools have been developed to actively probe qualities of infras-
tructure directly relevant to throttling and disruption [20,22,25]. These tech-
niques compare whether traffic flows of differing types sent at an identical rates
are received differently, thereby comparing against an established baseline to give
a clear indication of potential discrimination. Where such data has been core to
network neutrality debates, for countries such as Iran, government opacity on
broadband deployment means that domestic civil society and private parties have
had few opportunities to embrace quantitative data to push for policy changes.
Our research interest biases observations that are ubiquitous, recurrent and not
necessitating the intervention of users, in order to plot historical trends and ac-
count for localized aberrations, even if at the cost of precision or confidence. As
a result, to meet our operational needs, we resort to the use of measurements
that, while not specifically designed to detect throttling, broadly assess relevant
characteristics of the network in a manner that may indicate changes in the
performance and nature of the host’s connectivity.
In order to collect a statistically significant set of network performance data-
points, we utilize the data collected by client-initiated measurements of the Net-
work Diagnostic Tool (NDT) hosted by Measurement Lab (M-Lab) [21], which
contains both a client-to-server (C2S) and server-to-client (S2C) component.
The throughput test consists of a simple ten second transfer of data sent as
fast as possible through a newly opened connection from a M-Lab server to a
NDT client. In addition to measuring the throughput rate, the NDT test also
enables the collection of diagnostic data that can assess factors such as latency,
packet loss, congestion, out-of-order delivery, network path and bottlenecks on
the end-to-end connectivity between client to server.
M-Lab’s added value is both methodological and institutional. Founded and
administered by a consortium of non-governmental organizations, private com-
panies and academic institutions, including New America Foundation’s Open
Technology Institute, PlanetLab, and Google, M-Lab is an open data platform
focused on the collection of network measurements related to real-world broad-
band connectivity, and is not in itself a human rights or political cause. M-Lab’s
data is both non-partisan and widely-accepted, having been used by telecom-
munications regulators and development agencies in Austria, Cyprus, the Euro-
pean Commission, Greece and the United States. With the inclusion of NDT as
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Fig. 2: Unique Clients and Tests from Iran (Weekly), Jan 2010 - Jan 2013
a connectivity diagnostic test in version 2.0 of the Bittorrent file-sharing client
µTorrent, M-Lab gained a significant increase in NDT measurements and a wider
audience of users[4]. Since 2009, M-Lab has collected over 725 Terabytes of data
based on around 200,000 tests conducted per day. More relevant to our pur-
poses, in the month of January 2013, M-Lab collected 2,925 tests from 2,158
clients from Iran that we consider valid under the definitions and parameters
described in Section 4. Figure 2 demonstrates the rapid growth of network mea-
surements originating from Iran after the inclusion of NDT in µTorrent, with
unique clients representing the number of IP addresses seen and tests describing
the total number of tests. While M-Lab contains measurements from 2009, we
consider data beginning in 2010 to take advantage of the critical mass of clients
that resulted from the inclusion.
During the process of preparing and running our experiments, we took special
care to not violate any laws or, considering the diminishing opportunities for
international collaboration, expose individuals within Iran to potential harm.
All our experiments were in accordance to any applicable terms of service and
within reasonable considerations of network usage, taking care to not engage in
behavior that would be considered intrusive. The contribution of measurements
of a network to NDT or M-Lab does not denote political activities on the part
of the user, particularly as the use of Bittorrent file-sharing has broad appeal
and apolitical implications. Moreover, use of Bittorrent or NDT do not appear
to violate Iranian law, especially given the copyright and intellectual property
framework of Iran. All data originating from M-Lab is openly available to the
public, and collected in a manner that does not reveal potentially identifiable
user information, outside of the client’s IP address.
4 Parameters & Calculations
NDT provides a multiplicity of metrics and diagnostic information that describe
the test session. As outsiders attempting to assess the behavior and actions of
network intermediaries, we are relegated to beginning from assumptions and
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hypotheses founded on general principles of networking and how others accom-
plish throttling. Additionally, we are limited in the lessons to be gained from the
corpus of research on assessing violations of network neutrality, as we struggle
to establish control measurements and perform the active probing necessary for
proper comparative analysis. Most methods for measuring broad or application-
specific throttling assume that connections are initially allocated a higher level
of throughput, which is then throttled or terminated upon identification by a
network intermediary or exceeding a bandwidth quota. Therefore, our primary
form of detection of abnormal network conditions is comparative assessment
of selected indicators based on historical trends and incongruities between sub-
groups of clients. In order to allow this comparative assessment through baselines
that serve as controls, we define a set of measurements and aggregate clients in
a consistent and non-abitrary manner.
For the introductory purposes of this study, and based on cursory analysis
of existing M-Lab data which was generated during suspected throttling events,
we substantially rely on NDT’s measurements of round trip time, packet loss,
throughput and network-limited time ratio as potential identicators of network
disruption.3
Round Trip Time (RTT) (MinRTT,MaxRTT, SumRTTCountRTT )
The time taken for the round trip of traffic between the server to client,
computed as the difference between the time a packet is sent and the time
an acknowledgement is received, also known as latency. There are a diversity
of causes for latency, including ‘insertion latency’ (the speed of the network
link), the physical distance of the path taken, ‘queue latency’ (time spent in
the buffer of network routers), and ‘application latency.’ The last of these
components, application latency, is accounted for within the NDT test under
the metrics of Receiver and Sender-limited time windows. We are interested
in latency that occurs due to network properties, primarily the queue, inser-
tion and path latencies. Since the time taken should not change dramatically,
fluctuations indicate a meaningful change in connectivity, such as a network
outage that increases latency due to traffic to taking a longer route and
telecommunications equipment having taken on additional load. NDT also
provides different approaches to this measurement, which allow alternative
perspectives on the network. The minimum round trip time record (Min-
RTT) mostly occurs before the network reached a point of congestion, and
therefore is generally not thought to be indicative of real performance. Alter-
natively, the average of RTTs, through the division of the sum of all round
trip times by the number of trips may more closely approximate latency, but
is also vulnerable to outlier values. [28]
Packet Loss (CongSignalsSegsOut ,
SegsRetrans
DataSegsOut )
The transmission of traffic across a route is not guaranteed to be reliable,
and network systems are designed to cope with and avoid failure. These
3 For the purpose of space we have abbrievated the NDT-recorded variables of SndLim-
TimeRwin, SndLimTimeCwnd, SndLimTimeSnd
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mechanisms include maintaining an internal timer that will give up on traffic
the system has sent, alerts from the network that congestion is occurring,
and notification from the other end that data is missing. Packet loss for our
purposes is defined as the the number of transmission failures that occurred,
due to all forms of congestion signals recorded under NDT’s test, including
fast retransmit, explicit congestion notifications and timeouts. In order to
address this relative to the amount of extensiveness of the test, packet loss
is measured as a probability against the number of packets sent.
Network-Limited Time Ratio ( TimeCwndTimeRwin+TimeCwnd+TimeSnd )
The network stack of operating systems maintain internal windows of the
amount of traffic that has been sent and not acknowledged by the other party.
This enables the system to avoid over-saturating a network with traffic and
to detect when a failure has occurred in communications. The NDT test
attempts to send enough traffic to create congestion on the network, where
the transmitting end of traffic exceeds this window of unacknowledged traffic
and is waiting for clearance from the other side to continue sending. The
Network-Limited Time Ratio is calculated as the percentage of the time of
the test spent in a ‘Congestion Limited’ state, where sending of traffic by
the client or server was limited due to the congestion window.
Network Throughput ( HCThruOctetsAcked∗8TimeRwin+TimeCwnd+TimeSnd )
The NDT test attempts to send as much data as quickly as possible between
the client and an M-Lab server for a discrete amount of time in order to
stress the capacity of the network link. For the upload performance, this is
calculated based of the amount of data received from the client, and with
the download being the number of sent packets that were acknowledged as
received. The throughput rate is then calculated against the time that the
test lasted.
Measurements of connection properties allow for the indirect inference of
broader network conditions, particularly when applied in a comparative fash-
ion. For example, others have noted the varying degrees of correlation between
round trip time and the total load presented on a network[11]. While these stud-
ies hold a higher correlation on a slow link than on a fast one, the former of
which appears to more accurately describe the domestic connectivity of Iran. In
this scenario, it may be possible to identify periods where an increase in load has
created a bottleneck in the network or a build-up in the traffic queue on network
devices. Therefore, we assume that the decrease of throughput, or increase of
loss, will be associated with an increase in latency where traffic congestion is
occurring. Additionally, while most inter-network routing protocols will attempt
to route traffic over the best path to a destination, which can differ based on
load balancing and service agreements, a change in round trip time may indicate
a change in the path traversed by the data sent from the client to M-Lab. Due
to the variability in network conditions that can affect latency, we use two mea-
surements: the minimum RTT recorded in the session and the uniform average
over the entire test.
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4.1 Aggregation and Comparative Methods
In order to assess the general performance of the domestic network, client mea-
surements are aggreggated across higher-level groupings and evaluated based on
their median value. Where multiple tests are performed by a client during an
evaluation period, the most performant measurement is used in order to mitigate
potential bias in samples. Through giving preference to faster measurements, we
intentionally bias our pool of data against our hypothesis and assume that less
favorable numbers are aberrations. Furthermore, we prefer calculations that ac-
comodate for outlier values, such as false positives that occur in geolocation ser-
vices when foreign-hosted networks are registered to domestic entities. Finally,
we assume the natural shifts in consumer behavior or infrastructure development
that may affect measurements, such as the adoption of mobile broadband, are
gradual and upward trends. In practice this assumption appears to not only hold,
but we are led to question whether the availability of high-speed connectivity
has declined, due to administrative limitations imposed on consumer providers
and delays in the development of mobile data licensing.
For our purposes, we discretely aggregate measurements across three dimen-
sions related to the character of the tests or location of the client,
National: Measurements are grouped on a country level. Aggregation for large
geographic areas or service providers may represent a diverse strata of con-
nectivity types, such as ADSL, dialup, WiMAX and fibre.
Internet Service Providers and Address Prefixes: We use the Autonomous
System Number (ASN) as a proxy for ISPs. Within a research methodology,
aggregation based on the ASN provides a larger pool of clients at the cost of
being less granular than address prefixes. Autonomous Systems are gener-
ally defined as a set of routers under a single technical administration, which
keep an understanding of global network routes to direct traffic and announce
their ownership of blocks of IP addresses (address prefixes). There is a lim-
ited pool of available numbers for the labeling of Autonomous Systems, and
not every network has the need to advertises its own set of routing policies,
particularly where directly connected networks have the same upstream con-
nection. Therefore, a large ISP, such as Afranet, will generally maintain one
or more Autonomous Systems, bearing the responsibility to maintain an-
nouncements and peering, for the connectivity leased to other smaller ISPs,
government agencies, educational institutions or commercial organizations.
Additionally, since traffic paths across networks are constructed using cen-
trally allocated components of ASNs and address prefixes, both are registered
and externally queriable.
Control Groups: We attempt to identify logical, coherent groups of networks
and clients based on common characteristics, such as the nature of the
end user or performance. Control group measurements differ from service
providers because they are defined as narrowly as the data allows, rather
than existing segmentations. Such groups, particularly when defined by net-
work degradation, are possibly deterministic, however, these often produce
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surprising and mixed results, as described in Section 5. Furthermore, the
grouping of networks or entities, such as state agencies or educational insti-
tutions, during one incident is testable under other circumstances and may
serve as a control for future monitoring.
Finally, detection of significant events generally follows one of two themes.
These mechanisms are designed to highlight precipitous changes of service qual-
ity as a warning system to flag potential events, however, they are not the holistic
determinant of interest.
Threshold: A maximum and minimum threshold of reasonable values are es-
tablished based on previous trends. Since our dataset is frequently limited
to a small amount of clients that are subject to varying network conditions
and unrelated externalities, producing wide fluctuations in measurements, a
Poisson distribution is established based on a rolling average. Detection of
an abnormal event occurs when the trend breaches these bounds [19].
Variance: Internet Service Providers offer a diversity of products with varying
levels of performance across different markets, leading to variations in qual-
ities, such as connection speed and reliability. This technological and com-
mercial variation is exacerbated by informal differences, such the scrutiny
placed on the documentation necessary to obtain faster broadband imple-
mentation of administrative orders (elaborated in Section 5.2) and ability
to acquire network infrastructure, despite scarcity created by sanctions and
exchange rates. While these differences may change across time, there should
be a consistent trend of diversity within a free market. We evaluate the vari-
ation that occur in service quality amongst our subgroups such as ISPs or
prefixes. Therefore we presume that when external limitations are not im-
posed, variation will be high, while the contrapositive holds that at a time of
control, the variation will be low. We use the classic variance of the average
of the squared deviations from the mean to accomodate proportional change.
Analysis based on the variance of performance measurements day over day
across short historical periods can be applied to a single network or client
as between ISPs. We would anticipate that if an administrative ceiling were
imposed on throughput speed, particularly at a limit below the potential
capacity of the network, the variation would near zero, as the tests would cap
out at the maximum available bandwidth. We would also expect that trend
line of such an incident to follow a peak and valley model, where a sudden
decrease or increase leads to a spike in variance when the limit is imposed or
lifted, with low variance during the throttling. Figure 8, demonstrates that
in practice this hypothesis holds mixed results. While peaks do occur, the
variance, particularly the relative variance, remains high.
As these mechanisms serve as a warning system to direct further investi-
gation, rather than being a sole determinant of interest, we are less concerned
about its robustness. Additionally, for the purposes of identifications and coding
of events, we generally call attention to extremely abnormal values, relative to
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the normal trends. Once a significant change in service is identified, it is subject
to correlation against other metrics. More constrained boundaries simply lead
to more research cost and false positives. We assume throttling designed to stifle
expression or access is not a subtle event.
4.2 Limitations
While the integration of NDT into µTorrent has enabled the massive prolifera-
tion of points of observation across a variety of geographic locations and network
conditions, we remain relegated to user-contributed data collection based on a
limited set of volunteers. Changes in connectivity or quality of service cannot
directly be infered as an administratively-imposed censorship event. Addition-
ally, the Network Diagnostic Test’s data collection does not occur in isolation
of other externalities that are likely to affect performance. Cross traffic, local
and upstream network activities from other applications or users, independent
of the test can bias results through introducing additional latency or failures as
the test mechanism competes for bandwidth and computing resources. As an
end user is positioned at the border of the network, they cannot independently
account for the conditions outside of their control that may impact the results of
this test. Therefore, like others before, we attempt to mitigate and account for
externalities based on interpretations derived from observable data and general
networking principles [30,31].
Fig. 3: Diurnal Patterns of Throughput Measurements, Iran, Jan - Mar 2013
The extent of externalities often vary based on diurnal patterns of use and
in response to specific incidents. Using the performance metric of throughput,
Figure 3 demonstrates that observed network speed is higher in the early hours
of the morning, Iran time (GMT +4:30), than during the day. These trends are
mirrored in the performance across the week, and within other measurements,
12 Collin Anderson
such as packet loss. It would appear that Iran’s network does not handle the
additional load of office hours and evening use gracefully.
M-Lab-based services attempt to perform testing under favorable conditions
by selecting the measurement server by geographic proximity. These servers are
physically located across the world, including in Australia, Austria, Czech Re-
public, France, Germany, Greece, Japan, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Spain, Slovenia, Sweden, Taiwan, the United Kingdom and the
United States. Although one of these M-Lab hosts countries directly peers with
Iran,4 the selection mechanism predominantly directed NDT clients to Greece
(of the 2921 tests in January 2013, 50.39%), United States (22.08%), United
Kingdom (16.40%) and France (9.28%), with the remaining three countries con-
stituting 1.85% of tests. It may be possible that if there were M-Lab servers in
Turkey or Azerbajian, NDT tests would result in higher throughput measure-
ments, however, we derive our conclusions from relative changes, rather than
absolute numbers. Addditionally, users that are connected to anti-filtering tools
during the test are likely to be recorded by M-Lab as originating from the coun-
try that the tool routes its traffic through, and therefore not included in our
sample.
We also constrain our expectations on the types of throttling or disruption
that NDT will detect. As a diagnostic of direct connectivity between hosts, the
test is based on traffic patterns that likely have yet to inspire scrutiny from in-
termediaries. Other protocols, such as those employed in VPN tunnels, HTTP
proxies, Tor, voice-over-IP and streaming media, have at varying times been
claimed to be subject to targeted interference, based on port or deep packet
inspection. NDT’s measurement methodology is unlikely to detect more sophis-
ticated discimination against specific forms or destination of traffic.
Lastly, we assume that intermediaries have not sought to interfere or game the
data collection of M-Lab through artifically biasing measurements from hosts.
5 Findings
Using median country-level throughput, evaluated based on the most performant
measurement per client per day, we find two significant and extended periods
of potential throttling within our dataset, occuring November 30 2011 - August
15 2012 (a 77% decrease in download throughput) and October 4 - November
22 2012 (a 69% decrease). We identify an additional eight to nine short-term
instances where the throughput or variance between providers underwent a pre-
cipituous change, triggering the attention of detection mechanisms. These events
are correlated with a reduction of service quality across all networks, often more
significantly impacting home consumers than commercial institutions. In most
cases, these changes mirror more overt increases of interference of communi-
cations channnels. Lastly, within available indicators or traffic routes, we do
4 Based on Hurricane Electric’s public data of the peering of AS12880, of these coun-
tries, Iran is only directly connected with Italy
Dimming the Internet 13
not find evidence that these fluctuations are the result of externalities, such as
changes to international connectivity or domestic network use.
5.1 Periods of Significant Interest
Figures 4a and 4b outline the periods of time where fluctuations in values and
variance of throughput exceeded thresholds, respectively. The performance mea-
surements and indicators outlined in the prior section during these two extended
periods of interest are documented in the graphs of Figures 5 and 7.
Start Date End Date Change
Likely Events
2011 Nov 30 - 2012 Aug 15 -77.0%
2012 Oct 4 - 2012 Nov 22 -69.0%
Possible Events
2010 Jan 29 - 2010 Feb 2 -56.0%
2010 Mar 21 -36%
2010 May 12 -32%
2010 Sept 16 -39%
(a) Throughput (Daily)
Start Date End Date Change
Likely Events
2011 Nov 28 - 2012 Aug 20 -98.0%
2012 Oct 01 - 2012 Dec 3 -82.0%
Possible Events
2010 Feb 15 - 2010 Feb 22 -92.0%
2010 Mar 19 - 2010 Mar 26 -48.0%
2010 May 10 - 2010 May 24 -68.0%
2010 Oct 25 - 2010 Nov 01 -68.0%
2011 Jan 31 - 2011 Feb 7 -75.0%
2011 Jul 25 - 2011 Sept 5 -78.0%
2012 Dec 24 - 2013 Jan 21 -70.0%
(b) Variance (Weekly
Fig. 4: Precipituous Changes of Service Quality in Iran, 2010-2012
Although our methodology has not taken a deterministic view from prior
awareness, these two major events mirror our prior understanding of periods of
disruption. While we could not find instances where M-Lab or similar tests were
used in the commission of news reports on Iran’s Internet, our results often mir-
ror claims such as “The Internet In Iran Is Crawling, Conveniently, Right Before
Planned Protests”[5]. We also find potential events as detected by changes in
performance surrounding holidays, notable protests events, international politi-
cal upheaval and important anniversaries, such as Nowruz, the Arab Spring and
25 Bahman (Persian calendar date, early-to-middle February). These also often
parallel more overt forms of disruption, such as the filtering of secure Google ser-
vices (September 24 - October 1 2012) and significant jamming of international
broadcasts (January 31 - February 7 2011, October 2012).
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Figure 6 demonstrates the reverse methodology, correlating reported inci-
dents of public protests or opposition rallies with NDT measurements.5 The
dates identified focus on country-wide mobilizations, rather than localized events
such as protests by Iran’s Ahvaz Arab minority population in Khuzestan during
April 2011. While it is probable that localized throttling occurs, due to limita-
tions in sampling, it may not be possible to detect such actions until more nodes
of measurement are available. In addition to the throughput for the primary or
initial day of the event, the table identifies the data trends of the week and the
time period of the month before and after. This timeframe takes into consid-
eration the measures applied by the state to stifle mobilizations for publicly-
announced events and mitigate further political activities. These reactions are
reflected both online and offline, during Winter 2011, in reaction to plans to
protest on 25 Bahman, former Presidential candidates Mir-Hossein Mousavi and
Mehdi Karroubi were detained and kept in house arrest by security forces for
their role in the reformist politics. These mobilizations are compared against a
two month window as a baseline of the general capacity of the network at that
time.
We find a direct correlation between the precipituous decline in connectivity
for February 2012’s anniversary of the detention of Mousavi and Karroubi, as
well as October 2012’s currency protests. During all events, variation between
the average RTT of two month mean and those recorded during the event stayed
within a 20% threshold. While we anticipated 10 February 2010 as a potential
throttling event, we find that three days later, the date of our minimum mea-
surement during the period, was associated with both street protests and the
hacking of opposition news sites [2]. Similarly, while our weekly minimum for
the first anniversary of the 2009 Presidental election falls on the anticipated day,
the decrease in performance does not exceed a reasonable threshold of variation.
Finally, March 2010 stands out as a strong case of a negative correlation across
the two-month context, however, it may be reasonsable to consider the patterns
of network use established previously and this period’s proximity to the Nowruz
holiday. Contrarily, if lower-end consumer users are subjected to more aggres-
sive throttling, and as a result decide stay off the Internet until speeds improve,
the median of the national throughput would increase. Against our two-month
baseline, there was a 16% decrease in NDT clients on May 16 and a weekly mini-
mum of 41% decrease. Thus, this undergirds the need to detect both precipitous
decreases and increases in performance.
We anticipate based on the network principles and diurnal patterns pre-
viously established that network load will be directly correlated with higher
roundtrip times. In Figures 5b and 7b, there appears to be no such relationship
between the round trip time of the clients’ traffic and measurements of service
quality. It is less likely that these changes were the product of heavy use.
5 We identify as incidents of public protests, the following dates: 2010-02-11, 2010-03-
16, 2010-06-12, 2011-02-14, 2011-02-20, 2011-03-01, 2011-03-08, 2012-02-14, 2012-10-
01
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(a) Throughput Trends
(b) Average and Minimum Round Trip Time
(c) Throughput Histogram
Fig. 5: Suspected Throttling Event, Sep 2012 - Nov 2012
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Event Day Of Wk-Min Wk-Mean 2-Month
2010-02-11 0.18 0.14 2010-02-14 -34.3% 0.20 0.19
2010-03-16 0.26 0.19 2010-03-13 +7.3% 0.22 0.17
2010-06-12 0.16 0.16 2010-06-12 -21.6% 0.19 0.20
2011-02-14 0.18 0.15 2011-02-17 -18.9% 0.18 0.18
2011-02-20 0.22 0.15 2011-02-17 -21.1% 0.20 0.18
2011-03-01 0.18 0.12 2011-03-04 -52.3% 0.17 0.19
2011-03-08 0.16 0.16 2011-03-08 -14.0% 0.18 0.19
2012-02-14 0.03 0.03 2012-02-14 -102.9% 0.07 0.06
2012-10-03 0.25 0.09 2012-10-04 -86.2% 0.20 0.16
Fig. 6: Incidents of Widespread Protests and Median Throughput in Iran, 2010-
2013
Generally, sudden drops in service quality can be attributable to changes in
domestic networks or the availability of upstream providers, due to a multitude
of factors such as physical damage or electronic attacks. During the interval of
throttling identified as the beginning of October 2012 and described in Figure
5, the main international gateway provided by Information Technology Com-
pany (AS12880), experienced routing failures to networks connected through
Telecom Italia Sparkle (AS6762)[13,12]. However, Iran’s international gateways
are amongst the most unstable on the Internet, with frequent, short periods of
routing failures even during normal operations [14]. Therefore, it is important to
differentiate relatively routine failures from protracted and wide-cutting outages.
Additionally, as latency is a partial product of the psychical distance of a net-
work path, changes in distances of traffic traversing paths to the global Internet
should show as changes in latency. It remains unclear whether these reported
disruptions were due to connectivity failures, or downtime due to maintance and
application of changes to the network. In the case of the October currency crisis
event, these reported failures were short-lived as normal service appears to have
been restored within minutes, and little change in latency is measured.
Despite the centralization of domestic peering through the key points of con-
trol, Iran has a diversity of physical pathways connecting the country to the
global Internet, creating upstream redundancy. A clear demonstration of the
effect, and minimal impact for our purposes, of infrastructural failure occurs
within our October 2012 event, when an attack against a natural gas pipeline by
the Kurdistan Workers Party caused damage to infrastructure providing connec-
tivity through Turkcell Superonline [26]. While these changes were detected in
Figure 5a, they were within the tolerance levels established during the ongoing
throttling event. This event also appears to be reflected in a marginal increase of
the average and minimum round trip times of Figure 5b, as clients compete over
diminished resources and traverse potentially longer routes to M-Lab servers.
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(a) Throughput
(b) Average and Minimum Round Trip Time
(c) Variance (d) Network Congestion
Fig. 7: Suspected Throttling Event, Nov 2011 - Dec 2011
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Thus far, we have primarily focused on two extended periods of time for
analysis in order to explore the technical metrics outlined in Section 3 in an
environment subject to false positives. In Figure 4, we enumerated those events
that triggered our detection mechanism, including shorter term periods without
vetting their veracity. As discussed throughout the paper, the deeper we narrow
our evaluation to a network-level granularity, the more subject we are to the
limitation of the manner in which our data was collected. The longer a detected
abnormality lasts, the higher confidence we can assert our results are not aber-
rant testing, that independent mechanisms are causing peculiarities in network
that should not otherwise occur.
Fig. 8: Throughput Variance on Daily Medians per ASN, November 2011 - Jan-
uary 2012
Applying these lessons, it would appear that a number of false positives, gen-
eral the result of wide fluctuations in measures, trigger the detection mechanism
of one metric but do not register on elsewhere. We remain especially interested
in the reported incidents February 2010, March 2010, Feburary 2012, and Jan-
uary 2013. Additionally, we manually identify early April 2010 as an interesting
period based on low variance between ISPs, the amount of time spent in a
network-congested state and a rapid change in the daily variance of through-
put measurements on the top five networks. Other remaining periods of interest
consist of short timeframes that bear noteworthy links between metrics, but we
cannot confidently assert are meaningful, including several periods in June 2010,
late October 2010 and July - August 2011.
5.2 Control Groups
While throttling and disruption of international connectivity may be useful for
intermediaries that intend to stifle the free flow information for the general pub-
lic, Internet-based communications have grown to be a core component of state
operations, diplomatic functionalities and international business transactions.
The identification and segmentation of critical networks provides a means to
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Fig. 9: Throughput Variance Amongst Iranian ASNs, February 2011 - May 2011
mitigate the deleterious effects of communications loss. Traffic prioritization or
exemptions to disruptions for white-listed users and protocols should be trivally
easy in any modern network appliance. The utilization of such features for non-
censoring purposes on Iranian networks is already well documented [24]. There-
fore, we expect that high value networks, such as government ministries and
banks, would potentially be spared the majority of disruptions if possible.
Conversely, from the perspective of inferring meaning from raw data, we can
posit a diversity of circumstances for why a particular network or client would be
less aversely affected by country-level disruptions. Since all connections appear
to route through the same intermediaries, those that continue to have normal
service likely have been purposefully excluded. However, it remains unclear as
to whether throttling occurs at the international gateway or is left to be imple-
mented by the service providers. It may hold that throttling is mandated ad-
ministratively through the legal authority of the telecommunications regulators,
but implemented technically by the service providers. Comments from former
staff of Iranian ISPs have indicated that bandwidth restrictions have previously
been enforced through an order delivered over the phone or by fax. These claims
have gone on to allege that some ISPs, generally smaller and regional providers,
delay or limit compliance as they attempt to balance the demands of the state
with the possibility of losing customers over poor quality of service.6 If certain
ISPs are more likely to delay implementation of throttling orders, this may add
an indicator to our detection and establish performance disruptions based on
intent. In such a scenario, after a mandate is distributed, we would anticipate
seeing that larger ISPs enter into periods of throttling before smaller providers.
Were the granularity of our dataset to allow for it, this question would po-
tentially be answered by demonstrating that the majority of networks witnessed
changes within a very close promixity of each other due to central coordination
of implementation, as opposed to the delays and differing interpretations that
6 We note these anecdotal stories as a theoretical condition capable of being tested,
not as evidence or an asserted mechanism of implementation. Publicly-disclosable
documentation of the ISP role in censorship from either tool-makers or former staff
has been difficult to source due to the security issues.
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may come with diffuse, independent implementation. This would likely require
a data source that is statistically valid when reduced to an hourly basis, rather
than our daily aggregation in Figure 10. Additionally, this hypothesis requires
prefix-level evaluation, and thus inevitably runs into the limitations of passive,
crowdsourced datacollection, as smaller networks will have fewer users running
NDT tests, thus rendering assessment less truthworthy or responsive. This claim
also assumes that smaller ISPs are not subject to the throttling of upstream do-
mestic peers.
Fig. 10: Throughput, Aggregated based on ASN, November 2011 - December
2011
As M-Lab’s NDT data contains the IP address for clients, we are able to
identify those networks within higher tiers of performance, which could then
be used to create a control group or baseline in order to track service changes.
Using the two significant throttling events described in Section 5.1, we then
identify networks based on a threshold of 95th percentile of throughput rates,
and thus networks that may have priority during disruptions. In order to test
this hypothesis, we compare the median throughput rates of our privileged subset
against the national median. Since the sample of clients is based on a minority of
domestic Internet users and more susceptable to fluctations or misattributions,
we are more interested in the trends of these users and the identification of
the types of networks they belong to. Figure 11 demonstrates the relationship
between these higher tier services before and after a suspected throttling event.
Based on our assumptions of the narrowness of exemption rules, these clients are
aggregated within the most restrictive IP prefix available through Team Cymru’s
IP to ASN Mapping service [18].
Appendix Figures 15 and 16 enumerate the number of clients that recorded
measurements within the higher percentiles for the country, based on address
prefix. As the number of addresses in a prefix varies according to how they were
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(a) Normal Period, February 2011 - November 2011
(b) Throttling Event, November 2011 - June 2012
Fig. 11: Comparative Throughput
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assigned originally, the immediate value of such data is limited. A proper evalua-
tion of the trends of networks requires an understanding of scale and utilization of
the network. For example, Parsonline’s 91.98.0.0/15 and 91.99.32.0/19 address
prefixes are large consumer IP pools of over 135,000 addresses, across a range of
connectivity methods and customer types. It would therefore be less interesting
if these networks contained a substantial number of high percentile clients than
if a smaller ISP with less customers or peculiar ownership to perform well. Also
within this set is Mobin Net, the nationally licensed WiMAX data monopoly,
which appears to provide service from 128kbps to 2Mbps packages, far beyond
most ADSL offerings.
ASN Owner ∆ ∆ (+2) ∆ (+10) Oct 2012
AS12660 Sharif University of Technology -74.64% -70.46% -2.43% -58.62%
AS12880 Information Technology Company (ITC) -95.77% -93.26% -84.94% -91.57%
AS16322 Parsonline -94.26% -91.83% -67.05% -86.46%
AS25124 DATAK Internet Engineering -90.74% -93.42% -76.66% -87.23%
AS25184 Afranet -87.73% -78.46% -32.25% -68.23%
AS29068 University of Tehran Informatics Center -79.99% -90.31% -47.37% -69.43%
AS31549 Aria Rasana Tadbir -94.46% -93.19% -82.86% -91.60%
AS39074 Sepanta Communication Development -89.39% -90.92% -75.06% -91.60%
AS39308 Andishe Sabz Khazar -90.34% -76.92% -82.14% -80.96%
AS39501 Neda Gostar Saba Data Transfer Company -94.29% -89.80% -70.38% -86.13%
AS41881 Fanava Group -79.30% -83.64% -83.98% -73.19%
AS43754 AsiaTech Inc. -89.12% -89.49% -82.57% -86.36%
AS44244 Irancell -87.68% -88.40% -69.52% -77.57%
AS44285 Shahrad Net Company Ltd. -91.81% -85.17% -80.06% -62.23%
AS48159 Telecommunication Infrastructure Company -94.72% -94.76% -89.54% -87.06%
AS49103 Asre Enteghal Dadeha -95.51% -91.48% -71.45% -69.02%
AS50810 Mobin Net Communication Company -95.50% -94.63% -80.26% -91.10%
Fig. 12: Recovery After Throttling Event (Nov 2011)
Thus, for our purposes in assessing the trends of networks, we rely on statis-
tical measurements of relative changes. In the interest of stronger sampling, we
rely on larger ASN aggregation and define a threshold for consideration to those
that have performed measurements for at least half as many days as the time pe-
riod. Figure 12 demonstrates the recovery of network throughput by comparing
the mean values of the two month period preceding the November 2011 incident
with, i) the two months immediately after, ii) February to April 2012, iii) Au-
gust to October 2012, iv) the comparative degradation of performance during
the October 2012 event. Accordingly, between the two months preceding and the
first two month following the November 2011 event, every network under con-
sideration experienced more than a 74% drop in througput. Even within those
networks (ASNs) that do not meet our qualifications, only one experienced an
increase in throughput performance immediately after the November 30 2011
disruption, the prefix 80.191.96.0/19 run by the ITC, which according to reverse
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DNS records on the block appears to provide commercial hosting services and
connectivity for academic institutions, such as Shiraz University.
Fig. 13: Throughput for Sharif University (AS12660), Oct 2011 - Jan 2013
While no major network appeared to have escaped the events of November
2011 or October 2012, clear trends exist in the level of disruption and the rate
of return to normality. Academic institutions, as evinced in Figure 15, have
historically had access to faster connectivity prior to the November event [8].
Figure 13, the trends for Sharif University of Technology, demonstrates that
while the university has been significantly affected by network degradation, it
recovered faster than other networks. The networks owned by the Fanava Group,
University of Tehran Informatics Center, and Sharif University were the only
three to experience less than a 80% decline in throughput. Eight months later,
only Sharif, University of Tehran and Afranet had begun to return to their
normal levels. This mirrors Figure 11, where the trend of the mean of the 95th
percentile of tests was impacted by the throttling at the initial event. However,
this subset recovered to an approximation of prior values more quickly than
others.
Considering its large consumer dialup and ADSL Internet offerings, on first
glance Afranet’s strong recovery is unexpected in comparison to other ISPs, such
as Parsonline. While there are no upfront indicators of the type of connection
used for a specific client, it is possible to infer the nature of the source or the
network it is associated with, from indirect means. First, the registration and
announcement of routing information may provide labeling of the use, such as
“Shabake Almas Abi,” hinting that the client originated from a smaller ISP that
Afranet is the upstream provider for, or “AFR@NET company, Tehran, Dialup
pool,” which is most likely a consumer address pool. When we perform reverse
DNS queries on the address and prefix, the answers may reveal the owner of the
network through the domains pointing to the space. However, any prefix return-
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ing more than a marginal number of responses likely indicates that the network is
used for commercial purposes, as consumers generally do not host sites on home
connections, especially where addresses change dynamically. In our recover pe-
riod of August to October 2012, the majority of clients performing NDT tests
on Afranet originated from the blocks of 217.11.16.0/20 and 80.75.0.0/20, which
appear to host the infrastructure or provide connectivity for prominent com-
mercial entities, such as Iranohind and Saipa Automotive, or 79.175.144.0/20
and 31.47.32.0/20, which we suspect to be smaller ISPs or hosting providers. No
clients originated from the home and dial up address pools that were identified
at 78.109.192.0/20 and 79.175.176.0/24.
6 Conclusions and Further Questions
Absent independent, quantative evidence of claims, Iranian public officials have
argued that, “in spite of negative ads and fallacies . . . recent numbers prove that
Internet speed is very satisfactory in Iran,” defying the everyday experience of
the public [7]. In this paper, we sought to establish a historical, quantitative
dataset used to describe a phenomenon that thus far has existed solely in the
realm of rumors and anecdote. Immediately upon the most shallow evaluation
of the trends, we find frequent and prolonged changes to the service quality of
clients originating from Iran. We attempt to account for these changes based
on more quotidian explanations of upstream connectivity degradation, domestic
infrastructure failure, or increased network traffic. While we do find noteworthy
incidences of publicly-reported network outages and diurnal patterns of service
quality, these do not account for the length and timing of disruption, or the
extent of impact.
In order to test the hypothesis under consideration, we present a number of
testable assumptions about how artificial throttling would manifest within our
measurements, grounded in an understanding of the technological and adminis-
trative principles at work. While we quickly run into frustrations arising from
the scope and breadth of our dataset, we are also able to derive an initial set
of answers. When we are limited in the confidence of results due to the sample
size, origin or consistency of information, then we can narrow our investigation
based on the correlation of multiple analyses. Rather than detecting based on
simple indicators of throughput or variance, we are required to look at a range
of measurements.
By its nature, throttling is opaque occurrence and technical measurements
can rarely infer intent, however, the service disruptions documented herein can-
not be accounted for within normal expectations of network operations. We
establish that the periods of disruption identified are widely applied across all
networks but vary in magnitude and recovery, lasting from only a few days to
several months. These differences parallel the purpose of the networks, thus im-
plying special consideration of the socioeconomic impact in application of the
disruption.
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Finally, apart from citing specific historical and infrastructural circumstances,
this paper attempts to describe the first steps of a broader framework to account
for the stability and accessibility of international connectivity in states that im-
pose limitations on free expression and access to information. As noted by oth-
ers, Iran is within a large cohort of countries that have centralized international
communications transit to a limited set of gateways.
6.1 Remaining Questions
In order to continue the development of such a monitoring and accountability
tool, we anticipate the integration of NDT tests with independent sources of
complementary data and solicit input toward a number of outstanding questions:
– What remaining TCP/IP and NDT indicators apply to throttling?
Thus far, our indicators have relied largely on a few metrics available from
NDT that we anticipated would be directly associated with disruption. This
subset does not represent the full suite of measurements and properties avail-
able from M-Lab. Of particular interest remains the raw network stream
captures retained from the individual NDT tests. We anticipate using the
time to live (TTL) IP property, a counter that decrements for each router it
traverses in order to detect routing loops, to detect changes in the network,
as well as monitoring fields that may be manipulated by an intermediary
attempting to prioritize traffic, such as the ToS field.
– What could we learn from vendor documentation?
The principles undergirding our hypothesis and analysis have largely been
derived from the documentation available for the Linux traffic control sub-
system, which provides the means for the Linux operation system to per-
form throttling and shaping on egress network traffic. This documentation
is especially useful given the wealth of peer-reviewed publications on its
implementation concepts, configuration and performance, as well as the pro-
liferation of Linux-based devices at the core of modern public networks. Sim-
ilar features exist for Cisco devices, under quality of service traffic classes
such as rate-limit and traffic-shape [1], and for Huawei within the traffic be-
havior definitions [6]. Few telecommunications equipment vendors produce
network stacks that are written from scratch or ignore the basic principles
used for managing traffic flows, such as ‘token bucket’ mechanisms. Further-
more, open source reporting indicates that equipment from both of the prior
mentioned manufacturers are core to Iran’s Internet [10]. Therefore, per-
formance testing, emulation of environments, identification of instruments
of implementation and the development of more precise methodologies that
are closer to real world conditions can potentially be accomplished using
off-the-shelf equipment or documentation if the quality of data allows.
– What is the correlation between the disruption events and the
measured increase of packet loss or latency?
We have previously asserted that the decrease in performance without a
corresponding increase in loss or latency constitutes an abnormal network
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condition that may represent the imposition of rate limits. However, we
do not hold directly that throttling cannot be associated or accomplished
through these means. We hold both scenarios as loose relationships, and
infact the literature on traffic control describes artifical loss as a means of
throttling. Routers may police the rate of traffic flows by dropping packets
once an assigned buffer is filled. Thus, the relationship between throttling
and the factors of loss and latency is nebulous. In the case under consider-
ation, the former is particularly pressing. While during three days in Jan-
uary and February 2010, aggregated measurements register a 100% increase
in round trip time within twenty four hour periods, this instability is un-
matched within our three year dataset and potentially dismissible due to
the small sample size during that time. The rapid degradation of Iran’s con-
nectivity in late November 2011 is associated with over 30% packet loss,
a nearly 1000% increase over the preceeding days, only a few days within
this period registered less that 10% loss. The October 2012 throttling event
fits this theme with a consistent rate of about 10% loss. The only metric of
latency that matches the throttling event is the pre-congestion round trip
time, which registers a 49% increase, and maximum RTT, -10.5% decrease,
in November 2011, but is not paralleled by the measurements of average and
minimum time that we focus on.
– At which level of network infrastructure does throttling occur?
As we note throughout discussions on Iran’s infrastructure and our findings,
rumors and references in public documents have pinpointed some level of
throttling occuring on the part of the end-consumer Internet providers. This
is to be expected considering that ISPs retain legal responsibilities to police
criminal content, with the TCI serving an auxiliary role running its own fil-
tering and deep packet inspection. Thus far, NDT has not clearly provided
the granularity of data required to answer this question under the rubric
outlined in Section 5.2. Although these records show variations in the ex-
tent of disruption, at any level in the path, an administrator would be able
to differentiate the rules for handling traffic from different networks. These
questions also reflect the frustrations in determining the most narrow appli-
cation of exemptions to disrupt, as we search for IP prefixes, ASN and even
cities that have been less aversely affected by disruption.
– Is the technical application of disruption rules consistent across
domestic ISPs, instances of throttling, and countries?
Thus far we have avoid asserting a set of properties that we believe are
direct and exclusive evidence of intermediary throttling. We have noted at
length the difficulties of establishing such confidence within the nature of
the test and the opacity of administration. However, we also anticipate vari-
ances in implementation. Between any service provider or, more expansively,
countries, differences of technical capacity and infrastructure will lead to dif-
ferent opportunities or approaches. The example of Bittorrent throttling by
American and European ISPs provides an independent and more thoroughly
investigated illustration of the diversity of means available to manipulate
the connections that pass through a network, and demonstrates the role of
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specific equipment in various strategies. Additionally, intent matters. If an
intermediary is primarily concerned with disrupting streaming media, Inter-
net telephony or anti-filtering connections, then dropping packets or sending
connection resets may be a more efficient approached. Moreover, in such a
case, ISPs may even offer their users an initial burst of fast speeds, that are
then throttled down. Thus, a universal and explicit formula, as opposed to
statistical inference and manual inspection, is unlikely to ever be possible.
– What is the most appropriate criteria to filter tests for consis-
tency?
We impose conditions regarding the length and integrity of the records used
in our assessment, in order to filter out misleading or error prone measure-
ments. These limitations are: tests that lasted longer than 9 seconds and
less than an hour, and exchanged at least 1 packet and less than 120,000
packets. Additionally, it may be useful to impose restrictions based on the
M-Lab server, for purposes of consistency in routes and network conditions.
However, such a decision would require tests to ensure this does not impede
m-labs ability to accommodate changes in international routes. We do not
consider upstream tests solely for the sake of brevity, although this direc-
tion may be equally important should the throttling of upload connect be a
means of curtailing the outward flow of media.
– What is the future relevance of NDT in monitoring the next gen-
eration of throttling?
Iran’s strategies of censorship have followed a historical trend of increasing
precision of disruption. Whereas the June 2009 elections corresponded with a
multiple week outage of SMS services, by early Spring 2013 keyword filtering
on political slogans or terms associated with controversial issues had become
a normal occurrance. The blocking of SSL in February 2012 had shifted to
the blocking of SSL to selection networks and the redirection of secure traf-
fic through the interception of DNS requests [IIIP 1] . Similiarly, reports of
throttling appear more specific, such as SSL or multimedia traffic in gen-
eral, or SSL to services such as Google [IIIP 3]. The more that a censoring
intermediary narrows its understanding and limiting of offensive traffic to a
‘black list,’ a strategy that has substantial political and economic value, the
less that these disruptions will be reflected within the NDT test. However, a
countervaling pressure is presented by the adoption of sophisticated strate-
gies by anti-filtering tools to disguise or randomize their network traffic in a
manner that makes deep packet inspection increasingly difficult and costly,
such as the obfsproxy mechanism employed by Tor and Psiphon. Without
the ability to confidently distinguish normal traffic from privacy-perserving
connections that it cannot control, censors may be forced back into more to
the broad throttling regime or shifting to a ‘white list’ strategy that NDT
would detect.
– How do we best filter tests for consistency and accuracy? We limit
the records used in our assessment in order to filter out misleading or error
prone measurements. Limit the measurements to those downstream tests
that lasted longer than 9 seconds and less than an hour, and exchanged
28 Collin Anderson
at least 1 packet and less than 120,000 packets. Additionally, it may be
useful to further limit based on the m-lab server, for purposes of consistency
in routes and network conditions. However, such a descision would require
tests to ensure this does not impede m-labs ability to accomodate changes in
international routes. We do not consider upstream tests solely for the sake
of brevity. This direction may be equally important should the throttling of
upload connect be a means of curtailing the outflow flow of media.
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(a) November 24 2011 (b) December 4 2011
Fig. 14: TCP Stream Throughput, Before and During Throttling
Dimming the Internet 31
SHARIF-EDU-NET Sharif University of Technology, Tehran,Iran 213.233.160.0/19 165
NGSAS Neda Gostar Saba Data Transfer Company 188.158.0.0/16 126
UT-AS University of Tehran Informatics Center 80.66.176.0/20 112
SHARIF-EDU-NET Sharif University of Technology, Tehran,Iran 81.31.160.0/19 73
ASIATECH-AS AsiaTech Inc. 79.127.32.0/20 60
PARSONLINE PARSONLINE Autonomous System 91.98.0.0/15 53
IR-ASRETELECOM-AS Asre Enteghal Dadeha 188.34.0.0/17 49
NGSAS Neda Gostar Saba Data Transfer Company 188.159.0.0/16 48
PARSONLINE PARSONLINE Autonomous System 91.99.0.0/19 45
PARSONLINE PARSONLINE Autonomous System 91.99.0.0/16 42
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DCI-AS Information Technology Company (ITC) 78.39.128.0/17 30
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Fig. 15: Networks Containing Significantly Performant Tests, February 1 2011 -
November 29 2011
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Fig. 16: Networks Containing Significantly Performant Tests, November 29 2011
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